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In the Supreme Court
o f the State of Utah

JOHN WELLS,

1
Plaintiff and Appellant, I
vs.
f Case No.
CITY COURT OF LOGAN C I T Y ,
/ 13824
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF I
UTAH,
1
Defendant and Respondent. J
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent generally agrees with the
statement of facts contained in Appellant's Brief, but
in addition thereto submits the following additional
facts for the Court's information.
1. That following the arrest of the Defendant by
the officer, he was taken by the officer to the Cache
County Law Enforcement Building in Logan, Utah,
where a breathalizer test was administered to him.
That following the test the Appellant was released
following his posting bail with the bail commissioner of
the Logan City Court at the Law Enforcement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Building. That at no time did the Defendant request
to be brought before a magistrate.
2. The Respondent denies the statement in
Appellant's Brief at page 6 that there was a willful
noncompliance or a total disregard of the law by the
arresting officer. This question is now moot, as a long
form complaint was filed in the Logan City Court and
the Matter was heard on the long form complaint and
the question presented to the City Judge was whether
or not the Logan City Court had jurisdiction in this
matter. R. City Court (2). The City and District Court
denied Appellant's motion to dismiss, holding the
Logan City Court had jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOGAN CITY COURT AND THE
DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE
LOGAN CITY COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE APPELLANT WHO WAS CHARGED WITH
A TRAFFIC OFFENSE OF DRIVING WHILE
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING
LIQUOR.
Appellant in his argument under Point One cites
numerous statutes which he claims vests jurisdiction
in the Wellsville Town Justice of the Peace. Section
41-6-166 requires that a person arrested be taken
before a magistrate . . . "who has jurisdiction of such
offense and is nearest or most accessible to the place of
arrest.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Article VIII Section 8 of the Utah Constitution states:
" . . . The jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace
shall be as now provided by law, but the
LEGISLATURE MAY RESTRICT THE
SAME."
There are generally two types of Justice of Peace.
The one is known as the Precinct Justice and the
other is a Town Justice. In Cache County there are no
County Precinct Justice of Peace except the Logan
City Court. The incorporated towns have their own
Town Justice of Peace where they appointed, and in
case of Logan City a City Judge is elected.
The legislature has restricted the jurisdiction of
Justices of Peace when it amended Section 77-13-17
U.C.A. in 1971 to read as follows:
"When an arrest is made without a warrant
by a peace officer or private person, the
person arrested must, without unnecessary
delay be taken to a magistrate in the precinct
of the County or City in which the offense
occured . . ."
The 1971 amendment substituted "be taken to the
magistrate in the precinct of the county or city in
which the arrest is made," for "be taken to the nearest
or most accessible magistrate in the county in which
the arrest is made". . . .
Section 41-6-166 contains similar type language
wherein it states "the arrested person shall be immediately taken before a magistrate. . ." who HAS
JURISDICTION OF SUCH OFFENSE and is nearest
or most accessible" to the place of arrest.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In 1971 the legislature also amended Section 7757-2 which now reads as follows:
"Other than as provided by Section 77-13-17,
proceedings and actions before a
justices'court for a misdemeanor offense
must be commenced by complaint under
oath, setting forth the offense charged, with
such particulars of time, place, person and
property as to enable the defendant to understand distinctly the character of the offense complained of, and to answer the
complaint. The complaint shall be commenced before a magistrate within the
precinct of the court or city in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed9.'
It is apparent that the legislature intended that
jurisdiction of the offense clearly lies with the
magistrate of the precinct of the county or the city
where the arrest is made or the offense is committed.
Appellant admits that the offense and the arrest
took place outside the territorial limits of the Town
Justice of Peace of Wellsville, Hyrum and other incorporated towns in Cache County. Thus these Town
Justice of Peace do not have jurisdiction over this
offense.
Respondent contends that the requirement in
section 41-6-166 that requires the arresting officer to
take the arrested person immediately before a
magistrate that is nearest or most accessible, WCLS
repealed by implication, with the enactments of the
amendments in 1971 by the legislature to similar
provisions in Section 77-13-17, and also by the adoption
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the complaint provision as added to Section 77-57-2
as above set forth.
In the case of McCoy vs. Severson 118 Ut. 502, 222
P. 2d 1058, the Utah Supreme Court held that two or
more statutes construed will be construed to maintain
integrity of both where the later is irreconcilable with
former, the former will be repealed by implication.
This principle applies to the repeal of inconsistent
provisions of Section 41-6-166.
Judge Christoffersen is his memorandum decision
in refering to the amendment of Section 77-57-2
correctly states the following:
"This addition, this Court held, confines the
geographical jurisdiction of the Precinct
Justice of the Peace to the boundaries of his
precinct and the Town or City Justice of the
Peace to the geographical boundary limits of
the city or town. Such enactment, it is the
opinion of this Court, was enacted by the
legislature to eliminate the past practice of
arresting a person in one part of the county
and taking him to another part of the county
and shopping for a Justice of the Peace who is
more amenable to their case."
At the time that the legislature was considering
the amendments there was great public concern about
the practice of certain highway patrolmen and other
law enforcement personnel particularly in Salt Lake
County in taking arrested drivers before certain
Justices of Peace who would almost invariably find in
favor of the police officer. This practice was most
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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offenseive to our sense, of fairness, and the legislature
attempted to correct this abuse by the enactment of
the amendments to the two statutes above set forth.
The legislature in 1971 enacted a new Section 784-16.5 U.C.A. that gives county wide jurisdiction to
the City Court where they have been established.
This statute reads as follows:
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced
before a magistrate under Section 77-57-2 or
an arrested person is to be taken before a
magistrate under Section 77-13-17, the
complaint may be commenced or the arrested
person may be taken before the nearest City
Court Judge in counties where City Courts
have been established."
Judge Christoffersen in his memorandum decision
after much consideration correctly reconciled these
amendments and enactments when he held:
"The Court, therefore, denies the writ on the
following two grounds: First, that the offense
occurred outside the boundaries of any city
or town justice; that the precinct justice of
the peace was in fact the Logan City Judge;
and the second ground is that under 78-4-16.5
IN ANY EVENT THE COMPLAINT MAY
BE COMMENCED OR THE ARRESTED
PERSON TAKEN TO THE NEAREST
CITY COURT JUDGE, WHICH IS IN THIS
CASE THE LOGAN CITY COURT, for any
offense that is a misdemeanor that occurs in
Cache County under State Law and need not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be taken to nearest justice of the peace under
authority of that newly enacted statute."
The Appellants in their brief as part of
the statement of facts admit that the ticket issued by
the patrolman was not a valid promise to appear, and
when the Appellant was formally charged with a
complaint in the Logan City Court, the City Court and
District Judge properly ruled that it did have
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
HOLDING THAT
THE
GEOGRAPHICAL
JURISDICTION OF THE TOWN JUSTICES IS
CONFINED TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARY LIMITS OF THE TOWN, AND THAT THE
CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY IS THE EXOFFICIO JUSTICE OF THE PEACE FOR THE
COUNTY.
The record in this case is replete with references
to the word Justice of the Peace and Justices Courts.
The Plaintiff has made no distinction between the two
types of Justice Courts. The first is the Precinct
Justice and the second is the Town Justice. Cache
County has only one precinct and that is the entire
County and the Precinct Justice Court is the Logan
City Court. The various towns have Justice Courts,
but they are estabKshed by the town itself and have no
jurisdiction outside the corporate limits of the town.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Section 78-5-5 sets forth the jurisdiction of
the City and Town Justices as it relates to the nature
of the offense. However, it does not define the
geographical limits of jurisdiction of the Courts. This
Court in Leatham vs. Reger, 54 Utah 491,182 Pac. 187,
recognized the difference between the Precinct
Justice and the town Justice in respect to their
geographical jurisdiction.
The compiled laws of 1876 at page 729, Section 13,
with regard to the City of Wellsville, states as follows:
u

The Justices of the Peace shall be conservators of the peace within the limits of the
city and shall give bonds and qualify as other
Justices of the Peace and when so qualified
shall possess the same powers and
jurisdiction, both in civil and criminal cases,
arising under the laws of the territory and
may be commissioned as Justice of the Peace
in and for said city by the Governor."
A similar statement relating to Hyrum City is stated in Section 3 as follows:
"There shall also be elected in a like manner
two Justices of the Peace, who shall have the
qualifications of voters, be commissioned by
the Govenor, and have jurisdiction in all
cases arising under the ordinances of the
city."
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution
heretofore cited states that the jurisdiction of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Justices of the Peace shall be as now provided by law,
but the legislature may restrict the same, indicating
that the legislature may not confer greater
jurisdiction upon the Justices of Peace, but may limit
their jurisdiction as it existed in 1876. It is the State's
position that a Town Justice of the Peace can have no
greater jurisdiction than the corporate limits of the
city or town.
See Dillard vs. District Court of Salt Lake
County, 69 Utah 10,251 Pac. 1070, where this Court
cited what is now known as Section 78-5-4, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, and stated as follows:
"After the enactment of the foregoing section, the legislature created City Courts in
certain cities of the State, invested them with
a larger civil jurisdiction than Justices
Courts and in respect of their criminal
jurisdiction provided that a City Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction of all
cases arising under or by reason of the
violation of any of the ordinances of the city,
which such Court is held and shall have the
same powers and jurisdiction in all other
criminal actions as are or may be prescribed
for Justices of the Peace."
This Section refers to a Precinct Justice of the
Peace under Section 78-5-4 and not a City Justice of
the Peace under 78-5-5; and therefore, vests in the
City Court, County wide jurisdiction. The reason
being, that the territorial jurisdiction of Justices
Courts in criminal cases was limited to public offenses
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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committed within their respective precincts or cities.
This rational is further reinforced by Section 78-5-1,
quoted in the Plaintiffs Brief, which states that every
Justice of the Peace shall reside in and shall hold a
Justice's Court in the precinct, city or town for which
he is elected or appointed and Section 78-4-16.5,
relating to the filing of a Complaint in the City Court.
Defendant argues that arrest under Sections 41-6166 and 41-6-167, occurring under the Motor Vehicle
Code are distinctive from other misdemeanor arrests;
and, therefore, the Section 78-4-16.5 does not apply. A
reading of Section 41-6-166 states that whenever any
person is arrested for a violation of the Motor Vehicle
Act, the arrested person shall be immediately taken
before a magistrate within the County in and which
the offense charge is alleged to have been committed
and who has jurisdiction of such offense.
From the statutes heretofore cited, it is apparent
that a Town Justice does not have jurisdiction of an
offense occuring outside of his municipal corporate
limits regardless of whether or not he is the nearest or
most accessible magistrate.
The Logan City Court receives its County wide
jurisdiction by reason of Section 78-446 where
the Court was granted the same powers of jurisdiction
in all other criminal actions as are or may be
prescribed for Precinct Justices of the Peace under 785-4. This act could not have related to Town
Justices (78-5-5) as the City Court already had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the jurisdiction under 78-4-16; and therefore, this
grant of jurisdiction had to refer to Precinct Justices
to have any meaning and continuity, and, therefore,
county wide jurisdiction.
The Counsel for the Plaintiff unnecessarily
complicates his arguments when, in fact, the Motor
Vehicle Code itself requires that the magistrate be
within the county in which the offense is charged and
has jurisdiction over such offense and is the nearest or
most accessible.
The Plaintiff cites the case of State ex rel. Town
of Garland vs. Maughan, 35 U. 426, 100 Pac. 934, for
the proposition that City Justices of the Peace in
criminal cases have jurisdiction over the entire
county. A reading of the case will note that the case
was commenced in the Justice Court of Box Elder
County Precinct, Box Elder County, Utah. The Town
of Garland was situated within the precinct of Sunset
and not the precinct of Box Elder. The question then
was whether or not a Precinct Justice Court had
jurisdiction over a city ordinance where the city was
located within another precinct. The paragraph cited
in Plaintiffs Brief on page 20 is taken out of context in
that the Plaintiffs counsel was talking about Precinct
Justices and not City Justices. Therefore, the Court's
statement that Precinct Justices have county wide
jurisdiction was, in fact, at that time a correct
statement. A more appropriate citation from that case
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is found on page 936 where the Court says:
"We think the legislature intended just what
the language imports, namely that all offenses against town ordinances must be tried
the Justice of the Peace for the precinct in
which the town is situated."
Citing from page 937:
"It needs neither further argument nor
authority to prove that a Judge cannot,
without express authority of law, hold Court
outside of the terrirtory for which he is
elected."
This case stands for the proposition that the
Precinct Justices had territorial jurisdiction of the
precinct and when trying cases involving violation of
city ordinances had the further obligation to hold
Court within the town where the offense was alleged
to have occurred and this reasoning can be applied to
the case before the Court to the effect that a Town
Justice of Wellsville cannot, therefore, have territorial
jurisdiction outside of the municipal corporate limits of
Wellsville. Although, he may have jurisdiction of the
subject matter, he does not have territorial
jurisdiction and both are essential elements of any
Court's jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout this entire proceeding, arguments
propounded by the Plaintiff have steadfastly refused
to accept the concept of geographic or territorial
jurisdiction of a Court.
Many cases cited by both the Plaintiff and the
Defendant in this Brief have held that jurisdiction is a
two-fold requirement; that being jurisdiction over the
subject matter to be tried and territorial jurisdiction
over the place of the alleged commission of the offense.
Ignoring the requirement of territorial
jurisdiction gives rise to the confusion in the Plaintiffs
Brief relating to the various sections of the statute and
leaves the Plaintiffs Brief fraught with difficulties in
reconciling the various statutes. However, excepting
as we must, the concept of territorial jurisdiction as it
relates to the Justice Courts, reconciliation between
the various statutes becomes less confusing and
results in an orderly means of administration of the
criminal laws.
The Plaintiff has advanced a novel theory in his
Brief by claiming the Wellsville Justice Court to have
county wide jurisdiction, in that the people of a portion
of the County could appoint or elect a Justice of the
Peace who would have jurisdiction over geographical
areas outside of the municipality which elected or
appointed the Justice of the Peace; such, however, is
the case of City Courts, but the legislature expressly
made this provision in Section 78-4-16. In this case the
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Plaintiff was administered a breath test as provided in
Section 41-6-44.10, which states that any person
operating a motor vehicle in this State shall be deemed
to have given his consent to a chemical test of his
breath for the purpose of determining alcoholic
content. This test was administered as soon after the
offense as possible in order to preserve it's validity,
This section then must be construed as a later
pronouncement of the legislature and must serve to
modify Section 41-6-166, where it is stated that a
person arrested for violation of this act shall be immediately taken before a magistrate within the county
in which the offense charged is alleged to have been
committed. The Logan City Court at all times was, in
fact, the only Precinct Justice Court in Cache County;
and, therefore, had jurisdiction by virtue of the
arguments contained in the points in this Brief.
In view of the facts and the law cited herein, the
Defendants pray that the Supreme Court deny the
writ of prohibition sought by the Plaintiff in this
matter.
Date this 9 day of December, 1974.
Respectfully submitted,
B. H. HARRIS
Cache County Attorney
GEORGE W. PRESTON
Deputy Cache County Attorney
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
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